Foreword
Lawrence Lessig†
Richard Posner is the most prolific federal judge and academic in the history of American law.1 He is also among the most
influential. Posner authored dozens of books and hundreds of articles before his retirement from the bench in 2017. He signed
more than 3,300 judicial opinions.2 Those works are among the
most cited of any judge.3 They show a constant and wide-ranging
influence on the law. In the academy, the “differential in terms of
total influence on the casebooks between Posner and almost all [ ]
other judges is staggering.”4
Those facts together mean that this is just the first of many
symposia that will reflect on Posner’s career as a judge and
†
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scholar. But as the authors in this volume have known and
worked with Posner directly (ten former clerks and two
University of Chicago colleagues), there is much to be learned
from the impressions they leave here—not only about Posner but
perhaps as well about the character of our time.
Judge Posner came to the bench after an already
extraordinary academic career. His work in the academy was
foundational. Posner sketched big pictures, leaving generations
after him to connect the dots. His casebook, Economic Analysis of
Law,5 now in its ninth edition,6 is among the most widely read law
books of our time. It reordered the way scholars (and then
lawyers) came to think about critical areas of the law. And it
imposed a certain discipline on anyone trying to make sense of
how the law should evolve.
As the authors in this Symposium see it, that academic career
had an important effect on Posner the judge, especially early on.
There may be specific areas where his founding of the law-andeconomics movement drove specific doctrinal results7—though I
remember him admonishing his other clerks and me that he was
not appointed to impose a theory of economics on the law—but
the more significant effect comes simply from a discipline of
pragmatic reason. Rules should make sense. The enterprise of the
academic is to understand how or whether rules make sense.
Posner felt entitled to carry that discipline to the bench.
Throughout his career, he drove the law to make sense in
pragmatic or consequential terms—at least when there was no
“ukase”8 that directed differently.
How the law was to be so driven is a critical question. Posner
was not a lazy pragmatist, deciding an answer independently of
doctrine. (Indeed, I recall more than once his reversing an initial
vote in a case because “the opinion would not write.”) Instead,
doctrine provided the framework from which Posner built, or to
which Posner built. Thus, Douglas Baird sees first principles
guiding Posner’s development of promissory estoppel in contract
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law, as “the inner logic of the common law rules”9 began an inquiry that was then rendered subtle and specific by the specifics
of the facts. The reverse is true in tort law, as Saul Levmore
writes: the strategy was again to “use the case as an opportunity
to interpret inherited law as efficiency enhancing and then to
make modest changes consistent with this efficiency-minded
approach.”10 Levmore argues that Posner’s “immediate influence
[as a judge] might be described as incremental rather than
monumental, but it is bolstered by the fact that he advanced a
law-and-economics perspective in a manner that eliminated
conceptual competitors.”11 That is a similar conclusion to the one
drawn by Rachel Sachs, who finds little effect in property law
from Posner the judge but significant effects from Posner the
academic.12 In each of these cases, these two perspectives work
together, enhancing the work of the judge while making more
significant the work of the academic.
This is big thinking, though in a very specific sense. No doubt,
there are Dworkin-like judges in America, aiming to make everything make sense according to some deep theory of morality or
justice.13 We just don’t know who they are because that enterprise, within the American legal tradition, cannot succeed. It is
not within our DNA. It might exist elsewhere—Israel’s Aharon
Barak, professor and former justice of the Israeli Supreme Court,
may be the world’s most successful example.14 But within the
American legal practice, grand thinking is just not productive.
Yet modest, or maybe pragmatic, big thinking is. (Kathryn
Judge calls it “humble pragmatis[m].”15) The pragmatist does not
demand that it all fit together. He does not even insist that this
corner now under review fits at all. Instead, the pragmatist imposes a basic demand of reason, as he insists that the law justify
9
Douglas G. Baird, Unlikely Resurrection: Richard Posner, Promissory Estoppel,
and The Death of Contract, 86 U Chi L Rev 1037, 1051, 1055 (2019).
10 Saul Levmore, Richard Posner, the Decline of the Common Law, and the Negligence
Principle, 86 U Chi L Rev 1137, 1149 (2019).
11 Id at 1138.
12 Rachel E. Sachs, Judge Posner’s Reconstruction of Property Theory, 86 U Chi L
Rev 1201, 1204–05 (2019).
13 See Tom Lininger, On Dworkin and Borkin’, 105 Mich L Rev 1315, 1317–19 (2007)
(explaining Ronald Dworkin’s legal philosophy and noting Dworkin’s criticisms of many
judiciary luminaries, including Posner).
14 See generally Ariel L. Bendor and Zeev Segal, The Judicial Discretion of Justice
Aharon Barak, 47 Tulsa L Rev 465 (2011).
15 Kathryn Judge, Judges and Judgment: In Praise of Instigators, 86 U Chi L Rev
1077, 1080 (2019).
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itself. That justification is grounded in “consequences over doctrine.”16 Thus, mandamus doctrine gets “ben[t],” Dan Klerman
writes, to permit a thicker review of certification decisions in class
action litigation;17 Article III constraints are relaxed, Eugene
Kontorovich argues, to enable more aggressive judicial review;18
and multifactor balancing tests get replaced, Yair Listokin insists, with tests focused more directly on the substance of the results.19 Even when the authors conclude that the judge was ultimately incorrect, the error was motivated by a desire to make the
law make more practical sense. That is Listokin’s conclusion
about Posner’s innovation within tax law.20 It is Jennifer Nou’s
conclusion about his effort to police the boundaries for administrative law judges’ defense of decisional independence.21
This more basic constraint of reason over doctrine, over time
at least, may teach how little in the law makes grand sense. Posner’s
career certainly evinces that learning. He began with a strong assumption about the inherent efficiency of the common law. That
view evolved. Klerman describes a “late decadent” stage in the arc
of Posner’s work.22 But “decadent” is likely precisely the wrong
word: Posner’s opinions over time simplify the analysis to rely less
on devices and pretended doctrine and more on the informed judgment of experience, guided by the intricacies of the facts in the
cases decided. Many lamented this trend, but the lament is better
directed at the emptiness of law. To Posner, “[t]he cardinal sin of
most judges and justices . . . is their disingenuous allegiance to a
formal conception of law.”23 The key word in that sentence is “disingenuous.” There was nothing Posner hated more than that flavor of fake.

16 Id at 1090, quoting Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint,
100 Cal L Rev 519, 539 (2012).
17 Daniel Klerman, Posner and Class Actions, 86 U Chi L Rev 1097, 1103 (2019).
18 Eugene Kontorovich, Posner’s Pragmatic Justiciability Jurisprudence: The Triumph of Possibility over Probability, 86 U Chi L Rev 1117, 1130–31 (2019).
19 Yair Listokin, Posner on Tax: The Independent Investor Test, 86 U Chi L Rev 1157,
1162–63 (2019).
20 Id at 1170.
21 Jennifer Nou, Dismissing Decisional Independence Suits, 86 U Chi L Rev 1187,
1199–1200 (2019).
22 Klerman, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1099 & n 13 (cited in note 17).
23 The Judicial Philosophy of Richard Posner (The Economist, Sept 9, 2017), archived
at http://perma.cc/YPC7-RYZ4.
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Indeed, maybe surprisingly (until one remembers, as Baird
reminds us, that Posner was not trained as an economist but instead studied literature24), “the facts” turned out to be the most
important theory for this founder of the law-and-economics movement. All of us clerks were astonished, in the best possible way,
with the interest and care with which Posner came to know the
cases he would decide. Cases were morality plays; Posner was the
judicial chorus. And as Tim Wu writes, Posner displayed a palpable desire “to improve the law and prevent its misuse.”25 It was
just one of his superhuman capabilities that allowed him, practically always, to be the one most informed about the facts he was
adjudicating.
This was in part because Posner did his own work. Unlike
most federal judges, Posner wrote his own opinions. Clerks were
critics. But to write a story requires real understanding. That was
easier for Posner than for many—he wrote and read faster than
anyone I’ve known. But easier does not mean easy.
He also had a hunger for work. Kathryn Judge describes a
fight Posner never needed to pick, triggered by a matured understanding of the failures of the market as they applied to fiduciary
law and mutual funds.26 Judge Frank Easterbrook had written an
opinion more skeptical of the judges than of the market. Posner,
who would complete two books reflecting on the market’s collapse
in the 2008 financial crisis, was not as convinced of the rationality
of that market. And thus he was open to a rule that would allow
the law to challenge the market or, more specifically, as Judge
puts it, one that would reject the assumption that “markets are
far better than judges.”27 That standard, Posner argued, was more
consistent with the existing legal rule and more consistent with
reality.
The Supreme Court was the less-than-inspiring adult who
stepped onto the field to end the judicial quarrel. The Court’s
opinion celebrated not reason but the lobotomization of federal
courts. The questions that had divided Easterbrook and Posner,
the Court suggested, were too difficult for the judges. They were
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Baird, 86 U Chi L Rev 1055–56 (cited in note 9).
Tim Wu, On Posner on Copyright, 86 U Chi L Rev 1217, 1219 (2019).
Judge, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1081–84 (cited in note 15).
Id at 1088.
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for Congress. The Court thus backed away from Easterbrook’s innovation and Posner’s clarified standard. The manner of judge as
tinkerer was rejected. Judge as “robot” was affirmed.28
The manner of judge as tinkerer works well (or safely) only
in a judge with a certain character. Posner was not a populist. He
didn’t feign that all were equal in capability or insight. Yet he
consistently pushed ego out of his chambers. His clerks were to
call him by his first name. They were to criticize his opinions
openly and forcefully—and not just while they were clerks. One
summer, after I had become a law professor, I spent a month in
Budapest teaching law. These were the days before email, so to
send comments on a draft book Posner was completing, I had to
use the fax. We had an increasingly heated exchange over a number of days, and finally, one evening, I sent a letter I regretted. It
was too critical, and unfairly so. I immediately sent an apology. I
had “gone too far,” I told him. The next morning, I received his
answer. I could never “go too far,” Posner wrote. “I am surrounded
by sycophants,” he lamented. The last thing he needed was for
me, or anyone, to pull punches or, as Judge puts it, “to spend time
with otherwise intelligent people rendered mute by his glow.”29
This was a self-awareness of what it would take to be the kind of
judge that he wanted to be. To self-consciously relax (what he regarded as) the pretense of legal constraint required simultaneously boosting a practice of professional constraint. Posner as a
scholar studied that practice in the correspondence of judges such
as Cardozo and Holmes.30 He lived it as a judge in the exchange
with clerks and colleagues. So long as he was convinced that you
were disinterested—a condition that the lawyers in the cases
would not satisfy—he was eager to hear criticism and, in the ordinary case, engage it. That criticism had an effect—even, as
Hemphill writes, against the earlier positions taken by Posner the
academic.31
This practice mattered to the law. For example, Posner
grabbed the field of intellectual property and, as Tim Wu and
28

Id at 1092.
Id at 1085.
30 See Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 31–32 (Chicago 1990). See
also generally Richard A. Posner, ed, The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Letters,
Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. xiii–xiv
(Chicago 1992).
31 As Hemphill writes, although one of Posner’s first antitrust opinions affirmed an
argument he had advanced as an academic, one of his last antitrust opinions rejected an
argument he had made as a scholar. Hemphill, 86 U Chi L Rev at 1062, 1073 (cited in note 7).
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Jonathan Masur describe, changed its development. In part that
change was substantive: as Wu argues, Posner evolved the law of
characters and fair use in copyright,32 and in patent law, as Masur
describes, “he laid out a comprehensive economic theory of the
circumstances under which a patent holder’s actions will or will
not constitute violations of antitrust law.”33
But more than specifics, Posner changed the course of the debate within the field of intellectual property. Masur notes a profound effect on patent law once “Posner argued, more explicitly
than any other federal judge ever had, that the courts had gone
too far in expanding the powers of patent owners.”34 Posner was
the one who brought “criticism of the patent system writ large [ ]
from the academy to the judiciary,” Masur writes, leading it
across “the law’s version of the blood-brain barrier.”35 Once Posner
“began to describe the ills of the patent system, the tide seemed
to turn decisively against the advocates of ever-stronger patents.”36 This had, as Masur concludes, “as much of an impact on
patent law as judges who [had] focused on that field throughout
their entire careers.”37
There was a similar effect within copyright law. As the internet put pressure on old ways of profiting from creativity, the
courts were initially quite skeptical of dot-com innovations. Cases
like UMG Recordings, Inc v MP3.com, Inc,38 were extraordinary
in their punitive and unthinking embrace of the old against the
new. But when Posner penned an essay questioning this extremism, it was as if a boil had been lanced.39 The courts have become
the most important source of sensible evolution in the doctrine of
copyright as applied to digital technologies. Posner didn’t cause
that evolution, yet his writing made it respectable.
These were fields that had become stuck either through a
stacked judiciary (patents) or a fundamental shift in technology
(copyright). Posner’s effect here was thus quite visible.

32
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38 92 F Supp 2d 349 (SDNY 2000).
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But not just here. The essays in this Symposium span a wide
range of Judge Posner’s judicial work. Three focus on the common
law—contract,40 tort,41 and property law.42 Four on putatively
statutory fields—copyright,43 patents,44 tax,45 and antitrust.46 Two
touch roughly constitutional norms, as they consider the limits of
federal policing of the administrative state47 and judicial policing
of its own jurisdiction.48 One considers directly the work of courts,
and the doctrines that might add to the efficacy of courts doing
justice.49 And one hides a strong view about the character of this
judge under an essay putatively about a fight over fiduciary obligations with mutual funds.50
Whatever the quibbles, all reveal a common respect for the
extraordinary work of a judge not hesitant to press pragmatic reason into law. All of the authors in this volume are academics. It is
in our nature to admire such a commitment. None of us could imagine a life that had achieved it as effectively. And some of us
(Judge and Wu, especially, and I would add myself to this list too)
can’t imagine another serving in the model of Posner—not because humanity won’t produce talent as impressive (not many,
but some) but because our politics has made the idea of such people becoming judges all but impossible. Ours is an age, Wu says,
“in which we celebrate the individual but recoil from any real instantiation of individuality.”51 Posner is the quintessential individual; thus there will never be another Posner on the federal
bench.52
Never is a long time. And as there is so much reason for our
politics to solve the fundamental cause of that crisis, perhaps it
will be solved, permitting once again a judiciary that can include
a more colorful mix than the merely inscrutable or predictably
loyal. Yet whether it can or not, none of us can doubt how rare
and deep the influence of this judge has been, not just on us, or
40
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the law, but on the ideals of anyone who would practice the very
best of what the law could be.

